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The anti-GMO advocacy: an institutionalist and systems-theoretic 
assessment 
 
Vladislav Valentinov, Sefan Hielscher, Sebastian Everding, Ingo Pies 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose:  
Public debates on the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are strongly influenced 
by the NGO-led advocacy, most of which is harshly critical of genetic engineering. This 
advocacy has resulted in discourse failures marked by the disregard for the scientific 
consensus on the risks and benefits of GMOs. The paper presents a theoretical inquiry into 
this phenomenon.  
Design/methodology/approach: 
Drawing on American institutionalism and Niklas Luhmann social systems theory, the paper 
explains these discourse failures in terms of the problematic relationship between institutions 
and technology. 
Findings: 
Clarence Ayres would likely see these discourse failures as a form of "institutional resistance" 
to the progress of science and technology. In contrast, Marc Tool's social value principle 
stresses the importance of democratic legitimation and public acceptance of new technologies, 
while being sensitive to the possibility of ideologically biased discourses. It is argued that the 
institutionalist understanding of the interplay between democracy, science, and technology 
would benefit from a better account of Niklas Luhmann's concept of “complexity reduction”.  
Social implications: 
The article shows that some NGOs are powerful enough to actively shape, if not manipulate, 
public attitudes and sentiments against GMOs.  
Originality/value: 
The case of the anti-GMO advocacy calls for a new conceptualization of how democracy, 
science, and technology fit together.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the years, the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture has become 
one of the most hotly debated and controversial issues in public discussions on food safety, 
health, agricultural production, and the environment. A remarkable feature of these 
discussions has been an active involvement of NGOs which went a long way to associate 
GMOs with multiple hazards and dangers. NGO campaigns have been so successful in 
influencing public beliefs that, as of today, a significant share or even a majority of 
consumers in the Western world view GMOs as an unsafe technology (cf. MacDonald & 
Whellams, 2007). The problem with this view is that it goes against what appears to be the 
declared consensus in science. Paarlberg (2014, p. 224) traces the “dubious success” of NGO 
campaigns in public discourse back to the BSE crisis and the according “completely 
legitimate food safety scare that had nothing to do with GMOs”. Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth and the European Consumer Organization (BEUC) have been riding the wave of public 
mistrust in warning citizens of the risks of GM food “simply on ‘precautionary’ grounds” 
(ibid). Numerous supra-national institutions such as the United Nations or the European 
Union rightly give NGOs participatory influence over their political decision-making 
processes with a view on empowering civil society (cf. Will and Pies, 2016) and giving voice 
to environmental and societal challenges that would otherwise remain unheeded in public 
debates. It is hard to resist the impression, however, that some NGO campaigns contribute to 
discourse failures, in particular when they rest on populist positions (Will & Pies, 2016). 
Discourses can be said to fail when their participants disregard relevant scientific scholarship 
and evidence while being driven by emotions (Haidt, 2012; Siegrist, 2000; Connor and 
Siegrist, 2010) and moralistic claims (Fink and Yolles, 2018; Will and Pies, 2016; Hielscher 
et al., 2016; Wallis and Valentinov, 2016).  
This article suggests that the discourse distortions apparently arising from some NGO 
campaigns can be diagnosed and explained along the lines of American institutionalism (cf. 
Rutherford, 2007). In a sense, major lines of institutionalist thinking can be seen as an attempt 
to reveal and address certain forms of discourse failures that institutionalist scholars had 
identified in mainstream economic thought, in particular in neoclassical economic. According 
to institutionalist positions, discourse failures in mainstream economics occurred in debates 
on a broad range of concepts, including the ideas of capitalism, markets (ibid), corporations, 
competition (Galbraith, 1967), and human nature (Tool, 2001). Regarding these and other 
concepts, John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), a renowned institutional writer, distinguished 
between “conventional wisdom” and “circumstances.” His concern was to contrast the 
allegedly obsolete conventional wisdom of the idea of perfect competition with the evolving 
technological and organizational circumstances of the “new industrial state,” such as the 
pervasive corporate power, which, according to his view, was masked and promoted by the 
dominant neoclassical orthodoxy (ibid). An even more interesting parallel between GMO-
related debates and American institutionalism springs to mind upon recollecting the idea of 
institutional resistance to technology, an idea most adamantly advocated by Clarence Ayres. It 
is indeed hard to deny that GMOs present an outcome of scientific-technological scholarship 
that is resisted because of its misfit with some of the institutionally prescribed beliefs on not 
only the acceptable food but even the acceptable role of man in the order of nature. 
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Apparently, this moralistic and emotional rhetoric embroiled the resistance that drew Ayres’ 
criticism over half a century ago.  
Identifying these parallels is not intended to gloss over the essential differences between 
those discourse failures that were analyzed by institutionalists and those that seem to be 
induced by some modern NGOs. For one, NGOs themselves are rather a new kind of actor 
that has not attracted much interest of institutionalist scholars (cf. Valentinov, 2011). While 
much critical ink was spilled on corporations, their role in the GMO context seems to be that 
of losers rather than winners, let alone powerful vested interests. Also, science and technology 
that gave rise to GMOs stand in a negative rather than positive light, somewhat along the lines 
of the institutionalist concept of “ceremonial encapsulation” (Bush, 1987; Elsner 2012). In the 
case of GMOs, the NGO-induced discourse failures do not meaningfully translate into 
critiques of schools of economic thought. Instead, the remarkable feature of these failures is 
the proliferation of emotional and moralistic reasoning. All these differences provide fertile 
ground for a further development of the ethical core of institutionalism, authoritatively 
summarized by Marc Tool’s social value principle which refers to “the continuity of human 
life and the non-invidious recreation of community through the instrumental use of 
knowledge” (Tool, 2001, p. 293). Thus, to apply it to the disturbingly-disregarded cases of 
NGO-induced discourse failures, Tool’s principle needs a certain adjustment.  
We argue that the required adjustment may draw inspiration from at least two systems-
theoretic ideas of Niklas Luhmann, a luminary of contemporary sociological thought. One of 
these ideas is the critique of moral communication. Replacing the classical sociological view 
of the normative integration of society by the systems-theoretic vision of structural coupling 
of social systems, Luhmann did not envisage an essential role for morality. What is more, he 
took person-centered moral communication to be inherently unfit for the discussion of the 
ubiquitous systemic problems in society (Horster, 2012; Neckel and Wolf, 1994). He 
explicitly warned of the potential conflict generated by moral communication and called on 
ethics theory to develop approaches able to address them. While Luhmann’s theoretical 
skepticism about moral communication is not without its critics (Reese-Schäfer, 1999), it still 
provides a promising avenue to capture and analyze discourse failures. We reckon Tool’s 
principle can benefit a great deal from this perspective.  
Another of Luhmann’s interesting ideas is that of complexity reduction, which he saw as 
the function of social systems (cf. Luhmann, 1995; cf. Roth, 2017; Roth et al., 2017). This 
‘service’ is rendered necessary by the fact that the limited cognitive capacity of human 
individuals would not allow them to make sense of the exceedingly complex societal 
environment. What Luhmann did not fully appreciate, however, is that moral communication 
itself may be a form of complexity reduction, a kind of “rational ignorance” or “rational 
irrationality” (Caplan, 2007), used by discourse participants who happen to be overburdened 
by the compound nature of debated issues (Hielscher et al., 2016).  
Understood in this broad sense, the idea of complexity reduction potentially informs not 
only Tool’s principle but also the institutionalist literature more generally. We believe it helps 
institutionalism to better come to grips with the phenomenon of NGO-induced discourse 
failures. We elaborate in detail on this proposition in the remainder of this paper.  
 
2. NGOs and GMOs: uneasy bedfellows 
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2.1.The main arguments against GMOs 
 
The advocacy of a number of prominent NGOs against GMOs boils down to essentially three 
arguments: GMOs are presented as harmful for human health and the environment; GMOs are 
assumed to serve the economic interests of corporations at the expense of consumer welfare; 
and mainstream GMO research is supposed to be sparse, unreliable, and inconclusive with 
regard to GMOs’ long-run effects. So far, these three arguments have been at the core of NGOs’ 
successful campaigns for banning GMOs and GM foods in Europe. 
Argument 1: “GMOs are harmful to humans and the environment.” According to Friends 
of the Earth (2016), the majority of GMOs in agriculture have been engineered to develop two 
features: to contain Bt insecticide in all plant cells and to be resistant to certain herbicides. The 
NGO contends that genetic engineering led to an increase in the “use of harmful pesticides, 
decreasing genetic diversity and significantly increasing corporate control over seeds, farmers 
and agricultural research” (ibid). In the same document, GM crops are said to account for the 
dramatically rising use of Glyphosate, the occurrence of “superweeds,” and the decimation of 
milkweed and monarch butterflies. Earth Open Source, cited by the Organic Consumers 
Association (2016a), reports that GM crops “can be toxic, allergenic or less nutritious than their 
natural counterparts.” Still worse, this report claims that “animal studies link the consumption 
of GMOs to an increase in allergies, kidney and liver disease, ADHD, cancer, infertility, chronic 
immune disorders and more” (Organic Consumer Association, 2016b). Along similar lines, 
Greenpeace (2016a) criticizes that “[g]enetic engineering enables scientists to create plants, 
animals, and micro-organisms by manipulating genes in a way that does not occur naturally.” 
Argument 2: “GMOs serve economic interests only.” Adopting the posture of citizens’ 
steward, Greenpeace is harshly critical of those companies that deny the public the “right to 
know about GE [genetic engineering] ingredients in the food chain” (2016a). Of particular 
concern to Greenpeace (ibid) is the spreading of GM plants through cross-pollination which is 
supposed to be harmful to humans and the natural environment. Friends of the Earth (2016) 
likewise fear that “[c]orporations are driven to design, patent and profit from new 
biotechnologies rather than protect the public good.” While admitting that the new 
biotechnologies may indeed contribute to addressing environmental and public health 
challenges, the NGO claims that these innovative products are benefiting corporations at “the 
expense of people and planet” (ibid), primarily because of the power imbalance between 
corporations and consumers. Corporations “have far more power to determine how these 
technologies get used than people around the world who are affected by them” (Friends of the 
Earth, 2016). 
Argument 3: “GMO research is unreliable and inconclusive.” Greenpeace (2016a), 
underlining its skeptic position, urges that “GMOs should not be released into the environment 
since there is not an adequate scientific understanding of their impact on the environment and 
human health,” a position closely echoed by Friends of the Earth (2016). According to Michael 
Hansen (2014, p. 5), senior staff scientist of the American Consumers Union, “there is virtually 
no independent safety testing of these crops in the US due to intellectual property rights 
problems.” Friends of the Earth (2016) cite Hilbeck et al. (2015, p. 1) who refer to some 
“scientific research articles … that report disturbing results from … [GMO] feeding 
experiments with different animals.” The “number” which Friends of the Earth (2016) have in 
mind is exactly two, one of which is the highly disputed paper by Séralini et al. (2014). 
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The arguments put forward by NGOs have had far-reaching political repercussions at 
various levels. Taking to heart NGOs’ concerns, in 2003 the European Union subjected the 
approval of GM plants to strict regulations intended to “[p]rotect human and animal health and 
the environment.” Since 2010, these regulations are enforced by the European Food Safety 
Authority which undertakes the science-based evaluation of GM plants before their introduction 
into the European single market (European Commission, 2016; Davison, 2010), with the 
European Parliament and the European Commission additionally deciding on GM crop 
approvals on a case-by-case basis. The whole process of safety assessment turned out to be so 
complicated and long-winded that only one GM crop, the MON810 corn, could make it through 
so far (Eur-lex, 2001). Furthermore, the individual EU member states can temporarily restrict 
or prohibit the use and sale of GM crops on their territories if they provide reasons for doing 
so. As of now, 19 member states, including Germany and France, have made use of this 
opportunity (Coghlan, 2015), banning thereby even the MON810 corn, the single GM crop 
approved in the EU. 
This situation had been barely possible if NGOs did not enjoy active participation rights in 
the political decision making in the EU’s nested political bodies. Contrary to the United States, 
where the political role of NGOs has not been sufficiently institutionalized to prevent GM food 
production from flourishing (Doh and Guay, 2006, p. 65), NGOs have succeeded to bring 
virtually all of this production to a halt in Europe (Bernauer and Meins, 2003, p. 677). Currently, 
Greenpeace (2016b) is launching a new campaign to blight any possible attempts to relax 
European regulations by invoking the arguments of democracy and citizen rights. The claim is 
that people in Europe “have massively rejected GMOs, and … governments have started to ban 
their cultivation, but agro-chemical companies have cooked up a new way to get GMOs onto 
the European market” (ibid). The successful campaigns of NGOs against GM foods have not 
been limited to Europe though. As Paarlberg (2014, p. 224) notes, these campaigns “have 
succeeded in the developing world because they first succeeded in Europe.” As a result, only a 
handful of countries in Africa still allow growing GMO crops and retain access to one of the 
most efficient agricultural technologies. 
 
2.2.The state of science 
 
Contrary to beliefs promoted by NGOs, the overwhelming majority of high-quality scientific 
studies shows no additional risk of GMOs or GM foods to human health and the natural 
environment compared to the dangers of traditional food technologies. This is the central 
message of the open letter signed by 121 Nobel Prize-winning scientists who take issue with 
Greenpeace’s ongoing advocacy against GMOs (Laureates Letter Supporting Precision 
Agriculture, 2016). The Nobel laureates heavily accuse Greenpeace of misrepresenting the 
“risks, benefits, and impacts [of GMOs]” and of supporting the “criminal destruction of 
approved field trials and research projects” (ibid). As “[t]here has never been a single confirmed 
case of a negative health outcome for humans or animals from [the] consumption [of GMO 
technologies],” these scientists call upon Greenpeace to present these technologies fairly and 
in full awareness of the fact GM foods could help to feed a growing global population and to 
put an end to severe nutritional deficiencies, such as the lack of vitamin A, in developing 
countries.  
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Many important national and supra-national academies of science and medicine are 
pleading for more balanced political discussions of GMOs. According to the report of the 
United States National Academy of Science, Engineering, Medicine (2016, p. 10), “no 
differences have been found that implicate a higher risk to human health safety from these GE 
foods than from their non-GE counterparts.” A similar conclusion was reached by the French 
Academy of Sciences (Académie des Sciences, 2014) that exposes the current criticism of GM 
crops as scientifically unfounded. In 2010, the European Union’s Research Directorate 
concluded a lengthy report with the statement that “the efforts of more than 130 research 
projects, covering a period of more than 25 years of research, and involving more than 500 
independent research groups” have shown that “biotechnology, and in particular GMOs, are 
not per se riskier than e.g. conventional plant breeding technologies” (European Commission, 
2010, p. 16). A few years later, the European Academies Science Advisory Council (2013, p. 
1-2 and 8) maintained that GMOs should “be allowed to take its place among the scientific 
advances that European plant breeders and farmers can call upon” to address the challenges of 
population growth, rising food demand, and climate change. Given the overwhelming evidence, 
the National Academy of Sciences in Germany (Leopoldina) and the Union of the German 
Academies of Sciences and Humanities (2015) advocated the abolishment of the law that bans 
the field tests and commercial cultivation of GMOs in Germany.  
 
2.3.The discourse failure diagnosis 
 
In sum, the public debate on GMOs in Europe, including the NGO campaigning against GMOs, 
appears to be a discourse failure (Hielscher et al., 2016) for several reasons. First, as our case 
illustration shows, NGOs have predominantly emphasized the potential risks of GMOs while 
making dubious statements about the lack of scientific consensus on this issue.1 Second, NGO 
campaigning has belittled the potential benefits of GM technologies, such as the benefits to the 
natural environment as well as to the developing countries faced with the challenge of under- 
and malnutrition. Third, NGOs have brought this biased representation to bear on European 
politics, eventually turning political discussions against the actual scientific consensus (Lynas, 
2015). The ban on GMOs is an outcome of this discourse failure.  
It seems to be wrong, however, to attribute this failure to the supposedly malicious 
intentions of NGOs’ leaders. The dynamics of complex institutional systems is more 
appropriately explained in light of the “logic of the situation” (Popper, 1945, p. 90) or the “rules 
of the game” (North, 1990) than by imputations of personal maliciousness, which are typical 
of “conspiracy theories” (Popper, 1945, p. 94). Put simply, the NGO campaigning against 
GMOs likely presents an unintended, rather than intended, consequence of behavior (Hielscher 
et al., 2016; Will and Pies, 2016; cf. Lah et al. 2016). It is a well-known case that NGOs compete 
for donor funding and consequently for media space (Hielscher et al., 2017). As Swinnen (2011) 
has shown empirically, the competition for media space can lead to highly biased 
representations of facts and arguments. As an example, before 2006, NGOs had alarmed the 
media that small farmers in the developing world were being hurt by low food prices on global 
markets, suggesting that these prices need to be increased (ibid). Then, a dramatic rise in food 
prices beginning in 2007 caused NGO campaigns to turn into the opposite position, presenting 
the high food prices as a plague for low-income urban populations which could not afford 
expensive food, especially in the developing countries (ibid). In these examples, NGOs failed 
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to mention the beneficial effects of low food prices for urban dwellers and of high food prices 
for local farmers in developing countries, apparently because the positive news would not create 
a media alarm (ibid). This kind of behavior is, however, entirely rational in light of NGOs 
competing for the attention of potential members, supporters, and potential donors.  
This media bias may also explain why NGOs are successfully focusing on making up 
intuitive stories that dock to as many emotional or “moral taste buds” of the audience as possible 
(Haidt, 2012; for the role of moral emotions see also Lindebaum et al. 2017). Unsurprisingly, 
such stories will likely contain simplifications, biases, and populist positions that are immune 
to the scientific state of the art. The NGO-GMO nexus is a telling example of this kind of 
strategy. In their seminal work on empirical moral psychology, Haidt and Graham (2007) and 
Haidt (2012) identify six “moral taste buds” in humans: care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority, 
and sanctity. The GMO campaigns successfully activate four of them. The “care” category is 
enlisted since as NGOs warn against potentially harmful effects of GMOs; “liberty” and 
“fairness” are invoked in the critique of corporate power that allegedly poses a threat to 
consumers, citizens, and small-scale farmers who oppose GM crops. Last but not least is the 
appeal to the “sanctity” of nature. Genetic engineering is presented as an impious gamble with 
the genetic heritage of plants, with the implicit endorsement of the metaphysical view of the 
beneficence of nature for the human race. Along similar lines, Blancke et al. (2015) trace the 
public opposition to GMOs back to unjustified essentialism, teleological and intentional 
thinking, and the emotion of disgust. 
This case study illustrates that the quality of public discourses on GMOs strongly depends 
on the nature of incentives motivating the discourse participants, such as NGOs, journalists, 
politicians, corporations, and scholars. It is clear that the proliferation of moral claims and 
emotions prevents the discourses from accommodating a balanced account of both benefits and 
risks of biotechnological innovations as reflected in the scientific state of the art (Hielscher et 
al., 2016). Whereas the involvement of NGOs in political decision-making is rightly justified 
by the model of deliberative democracy, this justification cannot be reasonably assumed to 
cover the case of the NGO-induced discourse failure. Instead of translating discourse failures 
into political failures, deliberative democracy is called upon to set up a better institutional 
framework that would make it less attractive for discourse participants to rely on biased 
campaigning strategies. While deliberative scholars are beginning to discuss promising avenues 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012), the normative benchmark of this endeavor should not be participation 
but the consensus of society given to the consequences of collective decisions (Hielscher et al., 
2014).  
 
 
 
3. The institutionalist perspective  
3.1.The relevance of the institutionalism of Clarence Ayres 
 
The emotionalization and moralization of public discourses dealing with the acceptance of 
novel technologies invite the reconsideration of the work of Clarence Ayres. As an influential 
but also controversial scholar of American institutionalism, Ayres argued that institutions 
never fail to resist the emergence of technological innovations. Drawing on the work of John 
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Dewey (1922), he saw “the history of the human race [a]s that of a perpetual opposition of… 
the dynamic force of technology continually making for change, and the static force of 
ceremony—status, mores, and legendary belief—opposing change” (Ayres, 1978, p. 176). 
While this is a compelling vision, it involves an unfortunate oversimplification and 
downplaying of the crucial role of institutions. As Hodgson (2004, p. 353) points out, “Ayres 
did not understand that institutions can enable activity as well as constrain it and that 
institutions provide indispensable stuff and structure to social life.” No less contestable was 
the Ayresian conceptualization of the science-technological continuum as “a direct and 
unambiguous means of evaluation” (ibid, p. 349). Independent of the reductionist view of 
institutions as ceremonies, Ayres came up with an appealing and intuitive idea for the present-
day public debates about GMOs. This is the idea of institutional resistance to technological 
progress (cf. Ayres, 1978, p. xxvii).  
The reason why this idea is particularly germane to the GMO discourse is that it 
potentially accounts for the phenomena of emotionalization and moralization. Drawing on the 
entirely uncontroversial argument that in human behavior “social conditioning intervenes 
between physical stimulus and physical response” (Ayres, 1961, p. 54), he has shown the 
social conditioning to be the primary determinant of the feelings and emotions experienced by 
human beings. Because the social conditioning itself reflects the prevailing institutions, he 
argued, the emotional rejection of the advancing technology presents just another form of 
institutional resistance. In his words, “the ceremonies are re-enactments of what is presumed 
to be tribal history – the more ancient the better; hence their emotional impact” (Ayres, 1978, 
p. xvii). Furthermore, he joined Dewey (1929) in emphasizing the inherent relation between 
the prevailing moral beliefs and the “institutional imperative,” i.e., the conception that “all 
good things result from the assiduous practice of institutional mores” (Ayres, 1978, p. 186). 
He came to realize that the prevailing definitions of right and wrong must be expressions of 
ceremonial-institutional behavior (ibid, p. 163). These expressions are reinforced by emotions 
(ibid, p. 172), such as disgust and horror arising from the violation of taboos (ibid, p. 164). 
Accordingly, if emotionalization reflects the institutional resistance to the emerging 
technologies, so do moral appeals.  
Nor is this all. Ayres (1961, p. 63) also pointed to the subtle association of hedonistic 
morality with the unacknowledged metaphysical basis of neoclassical economics: “the 
spontaneity and vigor of … likes and dislikes seemingly provided the clearest kind of 
evidence that likes and dislikes are “natural” phenomena – that they are “given” attributes of 
all mankind, implanted in human nature by the Creator as one of the “pre-established 
harmonies” of the Order of Nature.” These critiques, of course, hark back to the famous 
Veblenian diagnosis of pre-Darwinian preconceptions of the contemporaneous (but also a 
significant share of the modern) economic science. In the seminal (1898) article “Why is 
economics not an evolutionary science?”, Veblen characterized the standpoint of classical 
economists as that of “ceremonial adequacy:” the “ultimate laws and principles which they 
formulated were laws of the normal and the natural, according to a preconception regarding 
the ends to which, in the nature of things, all things tend. In effect, this preconception imputes 
to things a tendency to work out what the instructed common sense of the time accepts as the 
adequate or worthy end of human effort” (Veblen, 1990, p. 65). Ayres and many other 
institutionalists would have most likely endorsed Veblen’s (1990, p. 95) diagnosis that the 
“imputation of final causes to the course of phenomena expresses a spiritual attitude which 
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has prevailed… in the eighteenth-century metaphysics”, with examples being the doctrines of 
natural rights and the order of nature.  
Evidently, these philosophical critiques of the economic science likewise apply to the 
preconceptions underlying the negative public attitudes to GMOs. According to Blancke et al. 
(2015), these preconceptions center around the teleological view of nature as the beneficial 
order. This view is reinforced by the essentialist thinking and the emotion of disgust which is 
activated when the allegedly fixed natural essences, such as DNA, are seen to be altered. It is 
a paradox, but it seems that the Veblenian-Ayresian critique of the teleological 
preconceptions of (neo)classical economics anticipates Blancke et al.’s (2015) philosophic 
deconstruction of the public opposition to GMOs. And, on reflection, it does not appear to be 
an accidental coincidence.  
 
3.2.Revisiting Marc Tool’s social value theory 
 
Since Ayres, the institutionalist school has progressed significantly, with the landmark 
achievement being Marc Tool’s contributions to the theory of instrumental value. These 
contributions are brought to a head in Tool’s social value principle. As Dugger (1995, p. 195) 
explains, “technological progress was the central concept in Ayres’s instrumentalism. Tool’s 
more recent instrumentalism includes technological progress, but in dealing with the 
revolutionary upsurges of the 1960s, Tool makes democratic participation the central element 
of social value theory. Therein lies the Tool legacy”. Democratic participation, or “the 
democratic quest” in Tool’s terminology, is inextricably linked to the “human capacity to 
think critically and coherently over wide areas of their experience” (Tool, 1986, p. 7; Tool, 
2001; Dugger, 1995). This capacity is thought of as counteracting the so-called “ism-
ideologies” which work toward removing theoretical material “from the universe of inquiry 
and truth-seeking from which it allegedly emerged” (Tool, 2001, p. 27).  
Even though both Tool and Ayres drew inspiration from Dewey (1922; 1929), Tool’s 
ideas on critical thinking and democracy result, among other things, in an explanation of 
institutional resistance that is different from that of Ayres, for whom this resistance takes the 
form of “past-binding myths,” i.e., “tradition, superstition, and magic” (Dugger, 1995, p. 
201). In Ayres’ eyes, "all these are anachronisms, holdovers from the tribal, primitive past” 
(ibid). In contrast to Ayres, Dugger (ibid, p. 202) argues that Tool’s approach “points toward 
a critique of the power of elites to impose invidious distinctions and cause disruptions of 
community re-creation through the use of ism-ideologies that block meaningful participation 
in the ongoing inquiry into how to further the good life.” According to Tool’s understanding, 
democracy means that “those who are affected by valuations should participate in the 
valuations” (ibid, p. 204) which challenges “elitism as the most serious resistance to progress 
in instrumental valuing” (ibid). 
The ambivalent role of NGOs in the present-day GMO debates challenges Tool’s legacy 
in essential ways. Granted NGOs are legitimately associated with democracy and democratic 
participation. But acknowledging their democratic quality does not exempt these participating 
organizations from legitimate charges of elitism and ideological bias. In fact, it seems 
plausible to argue that the democratic impact of NGOs is only put fully into effect if they 
prove such charges to lack justification. The GMOs debate thus illustrates that Tool’s social 
value principle itself requires acknowledgment that the democratic participation of institutions 
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per se does not guarantee the successful organization of public discourse. This 
acknowledgment, in turn, calls for a more nuanced conception of institutions.  
After Ayres, the conception of institutions has, in fact, become much more elaborate. In 
Hodgson’s (2004, p. 377) assessment, “at least in its treatment of technology and institutions, 
the work of J.F. Foster, Tool, Bush and others was more sophisticated than that of Ayres 
himself. Not only was Ayres’s inadequate definition of an institution replaced, but also there 
is a more complex and illustrative taxonomy of possible relations between the instrumental 
and the ceremonial. To a great extent, the work in this post-Ayresian tradition has been a long 
retreat from Ayres’s strict and questionable dichotomy”. This retreat is manifest in J.F. 
Foster’s (1981) point of view, according to which “it would be unethical to do nothing or to 
do too little for the purpose of facilitating the necessary institutional adjustment. But it would 
be equally unethical to attempt to force unfeasible change which might cause intolerable 
dislocations and maladjustments in the system” (Hill and Troub, 1995, p. 82). Drawing on J.F. 
Foster’s work, Tool (2001) proposed three “limiting conditions” of institutional adjustment, 
one of which is “the availability of warrantable knowledge,” whereas “the ability of a people 
to understand and accept the change being introduced” is another (ibid, p. 173). The “third 
limiting condition … has to do with the degree and timing of contemplated structural change. 
Any proposed abandonment of invidious or ceremonial activities of persons in institutions (to 
increase the effectiveness of the institution in performing its instrumental functions) must do 
the least possible violence to other instrumental functions of that or other institutions. 
Adjustment must be ‘minimally dislocative’” (ibid, p. 174).  
The last two limiting conditions identified by Tool add a further nuance to the role of 
NGOs by suggesting that the introduction of genetic engineering may indeed be more than 
“minimally dislocative.” Even if genetic engineering is entirely justifiable given the 
“available warrantable knowledge,” it may still put the institutional texture of society to 
substantial strain. The last two limiting conditions may be read as an urge that this possibility 
is taken seriously, or at least more seriously than Ayres would have likely thought of it. In this 
spirit, Klein (1995, p. 150) emphasized that “instrumental valuation… must be democratically 
incorporated into the social process. ‘Lags’ are a part of the process, therefore, of democratic 
incorporation of the fruits of technological progress into ongoing society.” It seems that the 
role of NGOs is just that: their activity comes down to the ‘democratic incorporation’ of 
genetic engineering, being at the same time indicative of the lagged nature of this process. 
Although this is a highly legitimate role, NGOs apparently cannot be advised to act in 
discourse-distorting ways. In fact, the NGO-GMO nexus calls for a new synthesis of the 
Ayresian scientific-technological continuum and the Toolian democratic participation. Both 
of these foci of instrumental value are attainable only if organically merged. Technology and 
science that disregards the democratic quality of society is failed science, abridged by a 
misleading concept of the social (cf. Hielscher et al., 2014). A democracy that ignores the 
scientific-technological continuum is failed democracy, crippled by the distorting effects of 
discourse failures.  
 
4. Insights from Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory 
If the case for merging science, technology, and democracy is correct, then institutionalism 
needs a respective attunement in the conceptualization of the instrumental function of 
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institutions. As Klein (1995, p. 133) put it, at stake is a theoretical account of the mechanism 
whereby institutions provide a “housing” of sorts to technology. To be sure, the nature of this 
“housing” is a fundamental question going to the heart of American institutionalism and 
institutional economics more generally. While no final answer can be attempted here, it seems 
pertinent to draw readers’ attention to the possibility that one can deal with this question in 
terms of Niklas Luhmann’s systems-theoretic idea of complexity reduction (cf. Hayden 
2016). As mentioned earlier, Luhmann saw complexity reduction as the primary function of 
social systems. Their function is, in turn, to relieve individuals from the almost impossible 
task of grasping the infinitely proliferating complexity of the societal environment. 
On reflection, this infinitely proliferating complexity is a concept that is not at all alien to 
institutionalism. In fact, this idea is implied in Tool’s first limiting condition of institutional 
adjustment, i.e., the availability of warrantable knowledge. It stands to reason that this 
knowledge in its entire interconnectedness cannot be processed by any human individual. 
Veblen (1990, 325 et seq.) seems to have drawn on a similar intuition in stating that the 
“information and proficiency in the ways and means of life vests in the group at large; and, 
apart from accretions borrowed from other groups, it is the product of the given group, though 
not produced by any single generation… The mass of technological knowledge possessed by 
any community, and necessary to its maintenance and to the maintenance of each of its 
members or subgroups, is too large a burden for any one individual or any single line of 
descent to carry”. Accordingly, “an individual can know only a tiny fraction of the total stock 
of knowledge” which means that “knowledge is specialized” (McCormick, 2006, p. 35). A 
logical implication of specialization is that “the opportunity cost of capabilities in one kind of 
activity is incapabilities in many other kinds” (Loasby, 1999, p. 66). Adam Smith’s (1795) 
History of Astronomy is another seminal contribution emphasizing the link between 
specialization and the exponential expansion of scientific knowledge. The essential point here 
is this: If the complexity of the warrantable knowledge stretches the limits of cognitive 
capacities of human individuals, then meaningful human action logically requires complexity 
reduction. And it seems plausible to see complexity reduction as a basic instrumental function 
of some institutions (cf. Thompson and Valentinov, 2017).  
Linking complexity reduction with institutions seems to be a direct, if not mechanical, 
transfer of the central Luhmannian concept into institutionalism. But there is a crucial 
difference. In the institutionalist context, complexity reduction is not as axiomatic as it 
appears to be in Luhmannian systems theory. To Luhmann, complexity reduction always 
works and is, in effect, coterminous with social systems as such. Commentators on Luhmann 
noted that complexity reduction might have problematic consequences related to the 
deteriorating sustainability of social systems (cf. Valentinov, 2017). But this critique does not 
call into question the functioning of complexity reduction per se. In contrast, Tool’s second 
and third limiting conditions of institutional adjustment do suggest that complexity reduction 
per se may break down. In line with Tool’s ideas, this breakdown occurs when the steadily 
expanding base of warrantable knowledge turns out to be so complex that it fails to be 
understood by the affected stakeholders, or causes severe dislocations that affect these 
stakeholders adversely.  
Regarding its impact on public discourse, the envisioned breakdown of complexity 
reduction will logically engender a bifurcation of two types of argumentative strategies. First, 
there will be voices pressing for the adoption of newly expanded warrantable knowledge in 
 12 
ways that may prove disruptive to the institutions providing structure and meaning to the life 
of some other stakeholders. Second, unsurprisingly, these stakeholders will likely protest 
using argumentative counter-strategies that boil down to what Ayres referred to as 
institutional resistance. As Ayres noted, if institutional resistance takes the shape of public 
discourse, then this discourse will be marked by both emotionalization and the proliferation of 
moral claims. Apparently, both of these argumentative strategies have been employed in the 
GMO debate. Following the terminology developed by Hielscher et al. (2016), these 
strategies can be coined “cynic” and “moralistic” reasoning, respectively. Whereas Hielscher 
et al. (ibid) explain these two strategies as individually-rational moves within an allegedly 
zero sum game between technology-driving corporations and the broader society, they may 
likewise be seen as manifestations of the institutional failure to reduce the complexity of 
highly complex technology adequately. What is more, given that scientific and technological 
knowledge continually evolves, such failures need to be acknowledged as a regular 
phenomenological pattern of modern societies.  
There seems to be an interesting parallel between Ayres’s critical view of the moral 
dimension of institutional resistance and Luhmann’s skeptical assessment of the role of moral 
communication in modern society. Luhmann (1991, p. 84) considered moral communication 
to be “a special form of communication which carries with it indications of approval or 
disapproval… Approval or disapproval is attributed typically according to particular 
conditions. Morality is the usable totality of such conditions”. The problem with this 
communication, according to Luhmann, is that the objects of approval and disapproval are 
persons who do not bear individual responsibility for circumstances that are institutional and 
structural in nature. As an example, it is indeed difficult to disagree with Luhmann’s 
argument that “we do not want the government to be declared structurally good and the 
opposition structurally bad or worse evil. That would be the death sentence for democracy. 
The same result can be seen in the case of true/untrue, of good or bad marks, of financial 
payments or their omission, of love decisions for one partner but not for another. According 
to Luhmann, functional codes need to operate on a level of a higher amorality because they 
must make their two values available for all operations of the system” (Luhmann, 1991, p. 86; 
cf. Luhmann, 1993). In making a case for the “higher amorality” of the modern functionally 
differentiated society, however, Luhmann appears to be throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater, for any institutional regime is predicated on the existence of a particular type of 
morality (Rutherford, 2007).  
From the institutionalist perspective, however, Luhmann’s skepticism contains a sound 
core related to the Ayresian concept of institutional resistance. The Luhmannian standpoint 
highlights that the continually advancing scientific, technological, and civilizational 
complexity is bursting the bounds of the absorption capacity of prevailing institutions. The 
institutionalist perspective, however, does not need to be limited to the Luhmannian 
standpoint alone. By emphasizing instrumental value, institutionalists are no less interested in 
the meaning of the complexity reduction function of institutions if this function is assumed to 
be well-functioning. It seems convenient to specify this meaning along the three dimensions 
of the resistance to change that have been identified in the organization theory literature: 
emotional, cognitive, and intentional (Piderit, 2000, p. 786).  
A key point about the emotional dimension is that the institutionalist perspective, despite 
the Ayres-Luhmann parallel identified above, must not be taken to be generally dismissive of 
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emotions and moral communication. There is no reason why these phenomena cannot present 
a stand-in for the unknown if the extant scientific knowledge is assumed to be limited and 
provisional. It is no secret that, throughout most human history, and especially in pre-modern 
times, religious morality has been developed to play an indispensable role in preventing 
catastrophes such as violence and disease. As Schaik (2016, pp. 124-165) argues, many of 
early Judaism’s laws, for example—including strict rules of cleanliness and sexual 
intercourse; laws limiting contact with strangers and excluding the unclean from the 
community; as well as rules against bestiality and homosexuality—were intended to prevent 
the spread of infectious diseases caused by bacteria, viruses, or fungi (cf. also Clark, 2010 and 
Murdock, 1980). As Schaik (2016, p. 152) has it, priests used simple empirical methods of 
experience to establish a causal relationship between a problem and a solution: “Medical 
symptoms … were identified as a threat, but the real cause of the illness remained a mystery. 
…Nevertheless, these laws had the desired effect (decreased infections) because they were 
based on the identification of dangerous behavior (sexual intercourse). In this instance, God 
served as a kind of heuristic. He was the variable that bridged the gap in knowledge and led to 
the adoption of hygienic measures.”  
In a sense, religious morality can thus be thought of as “protomedicine” that encourages 
human beings to exercise caution (or precaution) when societies lack reliable scientific 
knowledge about the potentially harmful consequences of new challenges and innovative 
technologies. In today’s modern world, a non-religious morality of precaution still plays a 
role in policy discussions, albeit a contested one. For example, the “precautionary principle” 
states that new technologies should be disallowed until it can be proven that they will not 
cause harm to individuals, groups, norms or other traditions. As critics point out, however, the 
precautionary thinking might ignore the opportunity costs of anticipatory, centrally-planned 
strategies of risk prevention. In its extreme form, “trying to preemptively plan for every 
hypothetical worst-case scenario means that many best-case scenarios will never come about” 
(Thierer, 2016, p. 82). For example, Hazlett (2017) argues that the world could have enjoyed 
the benefits of the cell phone much earlier if regulatory processes to receive permission had 
not delayed its launch for many decades. In the modern world, thus, the challenge is to use the 
precautionary traits of morality, and the emotions connected with it, to support—and not to 
stifle—the trial-and-error process of scientific research. This support constitutes the emotional 
dimension of the institutional complexity reduction function instrumentally conceived.  
The cognitive dimension of the resistance to change identified by Piderit (2000, p. 786), if 
seen through the lens of the instrumental value theory, would underscore the significance of 
the high quality of conceptual and theoretical systems that structure the knowledge about the 
change in question. A lively stream of scholarship in cognitive science (Suedfeld et al., 1992; 
Wallis, 2015) has made clear that the conceptual and theoretical systems may differ widely in 
their ability to accommodate (and be revisable in the light of) complex evidence. Wallis 
(2015) proposed to measure this ability in terms of the features of complexity and systemicity. 
Discourse failure, and the dysfunctional resistance to technological change, are likely if the 
prevalent conceptual and theoretical systems are marked by fragmentation and atomism rather 
than by the requisite complexity and systemicity. The latter qualities are attainable through 
the use of techniques such as the integrative propositional analysis (Wallis, 2015; cf. Wallis 
and Valentinov, 2016). The proliferation of discourse failures and the dysfunctional moralistic 
communication render such techniques increasingly relevant, for they present practical 
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instruments of developing not only better arguments but also better ways of sharing the 
publicly available knowledge.  
The intentional dimension of the resistance to change noted by Piderit (2000, p. 786) 
accentuates the role of the situational incentives faced by acting individuals. In the present 
context, this dimension translates into the need for the appropriate institutional framework of 
the discourse process. The accountability of NGOs seems to be an essential part of this 
framework. Will and Pies (2017) argue that discourse failures may present a systematic 
unintended result of NGOs’ campaigns driven by fundraising considerations. According to 
Will and Pies (ibid), this unfortunate result can only be avoided if NGOs adopt 
institutionalized commitments enforced by authoritative third parties with an eye to ensuring 
high standards of transparency and accountability. In a similar vein, Hielscher et al. (2017) 
develop a rational-choice-based governance approach identifying the dilemma situations 
faced by NGOs as well as the possible win-win solutions that are attainable through the 
mechanisms of NGO self-regulation (cf. (Iliopoulos (2013) for a related argument on the 
eligibility of agricultural cooperatrives for receiving public policy support).  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
One of J.K. Galbraith’s remarkable contributions to institutionalist thinking is the idea of 
“revised sequence,” which drives home the point that corporations are able to subtly shape 
and manipulate the needs of consumers, turning them, to use his trenchant expression, into the 
“indentured servants of the industrial system.” If corporations are indeed able to do so, this is 
by virtue of their economic and societal power that tends to be downplayed by conventional 
wisdom. The present article, and the case study presented therein, suggests that in the context 
of anti-GMO advocacy, the “revised sequence” may be likewise applicable to the relation 
between NGOs and the public. Similar to corporations in Galbraith’s work, some NGOs are 
powerful enough to actively shape, if not manipulate, public attitudes and sentiments against 
GMOs. The power of NGOs engenders discourse failure which means that the scientific 
assessment of GMO risks and benefits takes back seat to emotions and moral claims. 
Although some of its aspects have been anticipated in the work of Clarence Ayres and Marc 
Tool, this form of discourse failure remains a quite novel phenomenon to institutionalism. 
Whereas Ayres would have likely explained the activity of NGOs in terms of institutional 
resistance, Tool would have favorably commented on their democratic significance, while 
remaining sensitive to the possibility of ideologically-biased advocacy campaigns. In sum, the 
crucial complexity distinction refers to private versus public goods. The potential for 
manipulation—and hence for discourse failure—is much higher when NGOs use political 
communication strategies to promote public goods than in the case of corporations using 
marketing strategies to promote private goods. In the latter case, citizens find it much easier to 
develop a rational perspective based on personal experience because direct feedback 
mechanisms tend to support learning loops. 
In conclusion, the case of the anti-GMO advocacy calls for a new conceptualization of 
how democracy, science, and technology fit together in an instrumental way, and this is where 
Luhmann’s idea of complexity reduction provides a valuable starting point for future debates 
in institutional economics. A Luhmannian reading of Tool’s limiting conditions of 
institutional adjustment suggests that complexity reduction potentially qualifies as an 
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instrumental principle for the alignment between technology and institutions, for the 
complexity of the warrantable knowledge may obstruct both its understanding and its 
acceptance by affected stakeholders. Far from being automatic, the understanding and 
acceptance of institutional adjustment call for, and underscore the importance of, the 
engagement of NGOs in democratic discourses. But if this engagement is steered by 
incentives to promote discourse failures, it will be difficult to align technology and 
institutions in an instrumental way, falling instead back to the win-lose mode of moralistic 
reasoning. However, if this alignment is indeed instrumental, it will create win-win potentials 
for all concerned stakeholders, and society as a whole. Therefore, NGOs need an enabling 
environment—a functional governance structure with appropriate incentives—to better fulfill 
their societal role. 
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1 NGOs often use a paper by Séralini et al. (2014) showing a higher death rate for rats fed with GM food. This is 
one of the only two studies showing such effects, and it is also a highly contested one. Following accusations of 
technical errors and misinterpretations, it had to be retracted from the journal where it had been published first. 
Later, it has been republished in an open access discussion-oriented journal (cf. Casassus 2014). Today, it owes 
much of its influence to the NGOs’ claim that the mainstream research is allegedly captured by industry interests. 
Unfortunately, this claim does not acknowledge the fact that the Séralini research group itself had been funded by 
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